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Abstract
Most major water basins in Thailand, especially the Chao Phraya River basin, are now nearing closure. An
increasing amount of water is being diverted out of agriculture, and intrabasin allocation generates ten-
sions. Water productivity can be potentially raised by two economic measures with three possible effects.
The measures are water pricing and reallocating water away from agriculture. Water pricing may: (i) elicit
water saving and the adoption of water-saving technologies; and (ii) encourage shifts toward non-rice
crops with a higher economic return per unit of water consumed. Reallocating water out of agriculture to
other uses, possibly through market mechanisms, may also be conducive to overall economic gains. 
This chapter shows that, in the case of Thailand, the benefits of such reforms are much fewer than
expected and that transaction costs and political risks probably outweigh the possible gains. The case of
the Chao Phraya River basin suggests that the closure of a basin is accompanied by several endogenous
adjustments to water scarcity and that the scope for significant productivity gains is reduced. It is stressed
that the current physical, institutional and legal settings do not allow the implementation of such econom-
ics-based regulations. While emphasis is placed on the gap between the rhetoric of economic tools and the
conditions of the real world, the chapter also sketches guidelines for reform of the water sector.
Introduction
A water tax could be levied, in a manner similar
to the paddy land tax, over the whole area at
present cultivated and the future extension of
this area, as far as the fields are benefited by the
[irrigation] system . . . water rates could in
general be assessed in some proportion to the
quantity of water utilised, and would most
probably be a suitable taxation for dry season
crops and garden cultivation.
(van der Heide, 1903)
The hindsight provided by history, though
often neglected, is sometimes the best short
cut to understanding that what may appear
as desirable is not always feasible or even
logical when seen from a different perspec-
tive. The above statement is issued not from
a recent consultant report, as one might eas-
ily believe, but from the General Report on
Irrigation and Drainage in the Lower Menam
(Chao Phraya) Valley submitted in 1903 to the
government of Siam by H. van der Heide, a
1 The author thanks Randy Barker, Bryan Bruns and Madhusudan Bhattarai for their useful comments
on an earlier version of this chapter. 
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Dutch engineer. Clearly, all the calls for pric-
ing water issued during the 20th century
were, until recent years, mostly motivated by
a concern for cost recovery.2 Early legislation
on water also included some provisions on
pricing. The Royal Irrigation Act of 1942 was
the first to allow for the collection of a fee
that was to remain under ceilings of 5 baht
rai1 (1 rai = 0.16 ha)3 and 0.50 baht m3 for
factories, but these rates have not been
revised hitherto (Wongbandit, 1997). At pre-
sent, only a few non-agricultural users using
canal water are paying a fee.
It was only recently that water pricing
was proposed as a way to regulate water
use, in terms of volume or allocation. Such a
proposal was the consequence of growing
water scarcity in the country, as well as the
interest of donors and some academics in the
water sector to initiate measures of ‘demand
management’. In fact, despite being a tropi-
cal country with a monsoonal season,
Thailand has joined a host of countries cur-
rently facing water shortages. With the
exception of the southern region and some
forest areas along the border, hydrological
data show that the annual average rainfall in
Thailand varies between 1100 mm and
1600 mm. During the 6 driest months of the
year, from December to May, the country
relies chiefly on the water available in 28
main storage dams. However, only 15% of
the 200 billion m3 (Bm3) annual runoff
remains trapped in the dams (ESCAP, 1991).
Gradually, due to the concomitant devel-
opment of irrigated and urban areas, con-
straints on water resources started to be
felt, particularly in the Chao Phraya River
basin, where irrigated areas have been
developed beyond the potential expressed
by the available water resources (a situa-
tion qualified by the World Bank as ‘over-
built’). The expansion of the Bangkok
metropolitan area (BMA) led to the gradual
extraction of a significant share of the basin
resources for urban and industrial water
uses. Increasing competition for water
materialized through recurrent water short-
ages, occurring principally in the dry sea-
son and mostly affecting rice cultivation
and prompting restrictions in the water
supply of the BMA (in 1994 and 1999).
Solutions proposed to solve the current
water-shortage situation span a wide ideo-
logical range, from those supporting the
development of more water resources (new
dams, diversion from the Mekong River or
Salaween River) or the reform of the con-
cerned administrations to those advocating
a gradual privatization and commoditiza-
tion of water. This issue recently entered
the limelight following an announcement
that the granting of Asian Development
Bank (ADB) funds to the country (pre-
sented as being crucial to the country’s eco-
nomic recovery following the 1997 crisis)
would be conditional on its subscribing to
and applying the overall principle of water
pricing. The public debate has been signifi-
cantly obfuscated by the conflicting and
often confusing views on water pricing, as
reflected in newspaper declarations, inter-
views, consultants’ reports and non-gover-
mental organization (NGO) literature.4
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2 See, for example, De Young (1966): 
‘The light taxation affects any large scale government programme to improve conditions for the
peasants. It is evident that not until the government has assurance of steady and increased income
from local taxes can it expect to support large scale farm improvement projects … As yet the
government has not come to the conclusion that at least a partial support of such a project should come
from equitable taxation of the peasants. Any program designed to aid the farmer, such as large scale
irrigation, is recognised now only as a national investment and a responsibility of the government.
That this policy sooner or later must change is self-evident, for without local taxation the peasants’
demands for agricultural, educational, health, and transportation improvements cannot be met.’
3 US$1.00 = 40 baht in 2000.
4 An examination of official declarations reported in national newspapers gives a measure of the
fluctuating argumentation, reflecting the unsettled nature of the negotiations, the general nature of the
arguments and the lack of consensus even within a given administrative body (see Molle et al., 2001a).
Water Prod - Chap 17  2/7/03  9:14 am  Page 274
Increasing water productivity covers sev-
eral meanings. First, it means that the output
(say, in t ha1) of a given crop per m3 of water
applied is raised. This is tantamount to
achieving water savings (while maintaining
yields), which can occur at the plot level
and/or at the irrigation-system level, with or
without adopting new technologies.
Secondly, it means that the economic produc-
tivity of irrigated agriculture can be increased
by shifting to crops with a higher benefit (in
baht ha1) per unit of water used (m3). This
implies the selection of cash crops with
higher returns and less water demand than
rice. Thirdly, it means considering all alterna-
tive uses of water, including those outside the
agriculture sector, and allocating water pref-
erentially to those that yield a higher eco-
nomic value (baht m3). This chapter reviews
whether, in the Thai case, these three objec-
tives are sound and whether they can be
achieved through economic tools, such as
water pricing5 or water markets. It is neces-
sary to distinguish here between small- and
medium/large-scale irrigation projects. The
former are often epitomized by the tradi-
tional muang fay (river diversion) systems of
northern Thailand, while the latter are best
represented by the Chao Phraya delta. Unless
otherwise mentioned, what follows refers to
medium/large-scale projects, which make up
two-thirds of the country’s irrigated area. The
discussion also centres on the dry season,
when water scarcity is an issue, rather than
on the rainy season.
Water Pricing and Water Savings
The Director General of the Royal Irrigation
Department (RID) was recently seen on a
Thai national TV channel explaining, some-
what contritely, that water efficiency was
very low in Thailand (around 30%) and that
this had to be remedied in the face of the
water shortage experienced by the country.
This short sequence epitomizes better than
anything else the extent to which such a
statement has become conventional wisdom.
A thorough probe into the literature, how-
ever, provides little evidence that such a
value and the general validity of the state-
ment are established.6 Rather, it suggests that
such a view is derived from general analy-
ses, such as those of the Thailand
Development Research Institute (TDRI, 1990)
or Postel (1992a) (which may have a positive
role in raising the general awareness of the
problems lying ahead but may be totally
misleading when applied to a particular
case), and is further disseminated by repeti-
tion.
International agencies (and sometimes, in
their footsteps, local officials) commonly
report that Thai farmers are ‘guzzling’ water
or are showing ‘water greed’ (The Nation,
n.d.), furthering the general idea that effi-
ciency in large state-run irrigated schemes is
often as low as 30% and sticking to this over-
all vision without questioning it any further.
Yet research conducted in recent years has
shown that water basins tend to ‘close’ when
demand builds up and that little water is
eventually ‘lost’ out of the system. There has
been widespread recognition that focusing
on relatively low irrigation efficiency at the
on-farm or secondary levels could be totally
misleading (Keller et al., 1996; Molden and
Sakthivadivel, 1999; Perry, 1999; Seckler et
al., 2002, Chapter 3, this volume). When
analysed at the macro-level and the basin
level, many systems – river deltas account-
ing for the most significant of them – are
eventually found to operate with extremely
high overall efficiency. Thus the scale of
analysis of water-use efficiency is crucial.
Reform of the Thai Irrigation Sector 275
5 Therefore, the chapter does not address the relevance of pricing for cost recovery or other purposes not
directly related to crop or economic productivity.
6 The values encountered in reports and theses are by no means straightforward. They mix values at the
plot or scheme level and never consider the macro-level of the basin. Most of the drainage of small run-
of-river or pumping schemes usually returns to the river. Regarding large-scale schemes, recent reports,
such as JICA (1992), take 65% for the west bank (conservation area), while Binnie and Partners (1997)
consider values of 45% (but give no clue as to why such values are adopted). In all instances, the focus is
always on ‘classical efficiency’ and not on how it relates to the basin-level water flows and water balance.
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In the dry season, the Chao Phraya delta
provides an illustrative example of such a
closed system. Most of the return flow from
fields is reused downstream and most of the
drains have been gated to capture or retain
superficial and subsuperficial flows in the
dry season. Several tens of thousands of
tube wells have been dug to tap shallow
aquifers wherever suitable. Water releases at
Bhumipol and Sirikit dams (see Box 17.1), as
well as at the Chai Nat diversion dam, are
nowadays better attuned to user require-
ments and this results in little waste. If we
consider the efficiency of irrigation at the
macro-level, we see that the only ‘waste
water’ (i.e. not depleted for production pur-
poses) is water that evaporates in water-
ways or fallow lands or that eventually
flows out of the delta system into the sea in
excess of what is needed to control pollution
and intrusion of salinity in the mouth of the
river (in the dry season). As this water is
now extremely limited, it follows that very
little water is lost.7 The second component
of water ‘loss’ is that of infiltration, either to
shallow aquifers or to deep aquifers. In the
first case, water is tapped again through
shallow tube wells (forming secondary
water sources) or soon flows to the drainage
system, where it is reused. In the second
case, the infiltrated water reaches deep
aquifers, which are notoriously overex-
ploited in the Bangkok area, resulting in
land subsidence and horrendous costs in the
upgrading of flood protection and in flood
damages.8 Therefore, we may state that infil-
tration losses in the delta are not sufficient
to offset the depletion of the aquifers. The
water balance in the basin (Molle et al.,
2001a) shows that in the dry season the
overall efficiency of controlled9 water use is
around 88%.
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7 In past years, the Energy Generation Authority of Thailand (EGAT) may have released water only for
the purpose of energy generation, thus resulting in fresh water being lost to the sea. However, this has
been extremely rare during the dry seasons of the last 10 years. Whether this should still be permitted by
EGAT, even in the wet season, is discussed in Molle et al. (2001a). In all cases, such losses are controlled
and deliberate and, therefore, cannot be considered as decreasing the efficiency.
8 It is estimated that damages from the 1995 flood amounted to 50 billion baht (i.e.  US$2 billion).
9 Includes water released from the dams, diverted from the Mae Klong basin and extracted from shallow
and deep wells.
Box 17.1. Water allocation in the Chao Phraya basin.
The Chao Phraya basin can be conveniently divided in three
parts. The upper part (upstream of the two main storage dams:
Bhumipol and Sirikit dams), the middle part (from the dams to
Chai Nat) and the lower part, or the delta proper (see figure).
The dams are operated by the Energy Generation Authority of
Thailand (EGAT). In the dry season, according to the year,
between 2 and 8 Bm3 are released to be distributed by the
RID among 25 subunits called ‘Irrigation Projects’. Priority of
water goes first to Bangkok, then to the control of saline intru-
sion, next to the supply of orchards and shrimp ponds and last
to inland transportation and rice cultivation. The irrigation sec-
tor, despite receiving the largest share on average, has to cope
with a high interannual fluctuation of the amount of water
apportioned to it. Allocation is a top-down process, where the
shares of the Projects are centrally defined. Water abstraction
in the middle basin cannot be fully controlled by RID and has
been increasing dramatically (to 35% of dams’ releases). In
the dry season, pumping from waterways is the most common
way to access water.
Lower
basin
(delta)
Middle
basin
Upper basin
Sinkit
dam
Shumipol
dam
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Even when we carefully examine plot irri-
gation, it is hard to find the criticized pattern
of wasteful practices. The main reason is that
most farmers access water through pump-
ing. This is true for all the farmers located in
the lower delta (in this so-called flat conser-
vation area, water is integrally and individu-
ally pumped from a dense network of
waterways) and for approximately 60% of
the farmers in the upper delta. It follows
that, altogether, about 80% of farmers resort
to pumping, the great majority using low-lift
axial pumps powered by two-wheel tractors.
Although the Chao Phraya and Mae Klong
schemes were designed to supply water by
gravity, RID experienced difficulties in man-
aging reduced flows in the dry season. To
offset this constraint, farmers have devel-
oped an impressive individual pumping
capacity allowing them to tap whatever little
flow might appear in the canal. Because of
the costs incurred by these water-lifting
operations, there is little likelihood that
farmers may be squandering water.10 This is
consistent with recent estimates of water use
in the delta, which show that scheme effi-
ciency (evapotranspiration (ET)/net diverted
water) is remarkably high (60%), with only
10,000 m3 diverted ha1 and per crop, includ-
ing 15% of rainfall (Molle et al., 2001a).
The consequence of all these elements is
that few overall water savings can be
expected from a hypothetical change in the
behaviour of water users, because the effi-
ciency in the Chao Phraya delta, and proba-
bly in other closed basins of Thailand, is
already high. Molle et al. (2001a) have inves-
tigated the different paths that may lead to
improved efficiency and equity (dam man-
agement, shifts in cropping calendars, etc.)
but have shown that emphasis on irrigation-
use efficiency would be misplaced. In addi-
tion, it is both self-evident and widely recog-
nized that the individual volumetric pricing
of water is not feasible in the context of
small-scale rice farming in large gravity-irri-
gation schemes. Thus all incentives to save
water embedded in volumetric pricing are
lost when we are forced to shift to a water
fee per unit of land or other proxy.11
This drastic constraint is generally dealt
with by turning to the alternative of ‘water
wholesaling’, in which water is attributed to
groups of users (’water management blocks’,
for TDRI (2001)), for example, to those farm-
ers who are served by the same lateral canal,
on whom would fall the burden and the
responsibility to allocate and manage water,
solve conflicts and collect a water charge. This
alternative also has the advantage of ‘forcing’
farmers to act collectively to achieve greater
efficiency/equity within the command area of
their canal and to constitute a form of bar-
gaining power to discuss issues of water allo-
cation with RID. In such a case, the incentive
is passed on to the group, which is expected
to derive its own internal arrangements
aimed at saving water and hence reducing the
water charge of the group as a whole and of
each of its members in particular.
Such volumetric pricing could theoreti-
cally even elicit investment in water-saving
technologies, if the investments compare
favourably with the corresponding financial
savings. The Iran case described by Perry
(2001) suggests that technological change is
too expensive for farmers, irrespective of the
cost of water, and that the net value of water
consumed (in $ m3) is comparable to the
costs of reducing consumption through
improved technologies. In addition, such
investments are to be made (collectively) by
upstream farmers to the benefit of the down-
stream farmers, a scenario that is difficult to
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10 In some cases, the costs of pumping may even discourage farmers from growing a second or third crop.
These costs, combined with poor levelling, also explain the low use of water in sugarcane cultivation.
11 In addition, the introduction of such a fee per area is doomed to encounter severe difficulties in
situations where access to water is highly heterogeneous. This is the case, for example, in the upper delta,
where some farmers may access water throughout the year, while elsewhere others receive a very
uncertain supply. In addition, this access can be partly provided by gravity and partly by pumping, and
their respective shares can vary greatly from one year to the next. Therefore, quantifying the real benefit
of irrigation water for hundreds of thousands of farmers, when this benefit is, spatially and temporally,
highly heterogeneous, is deemed impractical.
Water Prod - Chap 17  2/7/03  9:14 am  Page 277
envision without public intervention. In the
Thai case, there is no available technology
(hardware) that could bring about drastic
water savings in rice cultivation, but such a
mechanism might encourage technical inno-
vation regarding water management at the
plot level.12
This appealing solution of water wholesal-
ing features nicely in paper proposals of con-
sultants and academics, and is credited with
some success in Mexico or Andhra Pradesh.
However, it implies a series of prerequisites
that are often not given due attention (Molle,
2001; Molle et al., 2001a). A detailed review of
these conditions is beyond the scope of this
chapter but it can be mentioned that the main
difficulties lie in the definition of a ‘service’ to
which the fee would correspond. This
includes the question of both allocation (the
process to define each year how the fluctuat-
ing water stock in the dams is to be appor-
tioned) and distribution (ensure the timing
and the discharges of deliveries as agreed
upon). The degree of technical and institu-
tional control over the whole water basin is at
present insufficient to ensure this. On the
other hand, it is debatable whether there is
enough social capital within a rather heteroge-
neous farming population to carry out all the
tasks that the groups are expected to perform.
In sum, water pricing on an individual
basis is possible only if based on the plot area
and is, therefore, tantamount to an additional
tax with, at best, no impact on water produc-
tivity.13 The ‘wholesaling’ of water is an option
that requires far-reaching improvements to be
brought about at the technical and institu-
tional levels prior to implementation. Even in
such a case, there is no strong empirical evi-
dence that the turnover of management to
water-user groups has any significant impact
on water productivity (Samad, 2001). In addi-
tion, a careful analysis of field water use, as
well as water accounting for the basin, does
not point to significant water losses (but some
improvements in dam management and
scheduling are nevertheless desirable and pos-
sible). This suggests that the heavy transaction
costs incurred by the establishment of some
form of water pricing would far outweigh the
meagre potential gains in productivity.
A corollary from this conclusion is that
the refrain ‘water is consistently underval-
ued, and as a result is chronically overused’
(Postel, 1992a) may well have little validity
in closed basins. In Thailand, many
observers, such as Christensen and Boon-
Long (1994), who believe that ‘since water is
not appropriately priced, it is used ineffi-
ciently, and consumers have no incentive to
economize’, have also considered this postu-
late as self-evident for irrigation.14 Ironically,
despite severely lacking consistency, it is pre-
sented as the main justification for water
pricing and gains apparent consistency only
under the effect of repetition.15
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12 Experiences from China and Madagascar suggest that yields can be maintained with innovative
water-management techniques conducive to water savings. At the moment, there is no clear picture as to
whether this is allowed by particular socio-economic and cultural factors or whether there is scope for
the dissemination of these innovations. For the Madagascar case, see Moser and Barett (2001) for a
pessimistic view on such a hope.
13 It is often noted (Moore, 1989; Meinzen-Dick and Rosegrant, 1997) that the impact is more likely to be
negative, as farmers paying for water feel that they have acquired a right to more ‘comfort’ in use and
are less concerned with how much water they consume.
14 This is an extrapolation of the experience with urban water, which differs markedly from irrigation.
15 See the declarations of an official of the Ministry of Agriculture: ‘Water should be priced in order to
increase the efficiency of its use in the farm sector’ (The Nation, 2000a); ‘Agricultural experts agree that
water-pricing measures would help improve efficiency in water use among farmers’ (The Nation, 1999); the
Director of the National Water Resources Committee: ‘In reality water is scarce, and the only mechanism to
save water and encourage efficient use is to give it a price’ (The Nation, 2000b); the resident adviser for the
ADB in Thailand: ‘International best practices suggest that efficiency in water management can be
improved considerably through imposition of nominal water user fees’ (Bangkok Post, 2000); ‘Currently,
most farmers don’t have to pay for irrigation water and, thus, have little incentive to conserve water or to
use it efficiently on high-value crops. As a result, irrigation efficiency is under 30 percent’ (TDRI, 1990), etc.
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Water Productivity and Crop Choice
Conventional wisdom admittedly considers
rice as a water-consuming crop.16 The possi-
bility of achieving water conservation by
inducing a shift away from rice to field
crops, such as mung bean, groundnut,
maize, or chilli, which consume (ET)
approximately 60% of the amount of water
needed for rice, has long been underlined by
policy makers and has formed the corner-
stone of public projects aimed at fostering
agricultural diversification (Siriluck and
Kammeier, 2000). This was already a recom-
mendation of the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) as early as the 1960s, as
well as the alternative that ‘received the
most attention’ from Small (1972) in his
study of the delta. Australia and Japan were
jointly engaged in agronomic tests in the late
1960s and 1970s in order to propose field
crops for irrigated areas. ‘In recent years,
low export prices for rice, and the difficul-
ties encountered by Thailand in maintaining
her export markets have further intensified
the interest in stimulating the production of
upland crops’, noted Small in 1972. Such a
concern has been constantly expressed for at
least four decades. Even nowadays, it is not
rare to hear officials complaining off the
record that ‘farmers are stubborn’, that ‘they
lack knowledge and only know how to grow
rice’, and that ‘they oppose any change’
described by outsiders as beneficial.
Planting crops with lower water require-
ments would, ideally, allow more farmers to
benefit from a second crop in the dry season.
If the economic benefit of such crops com-
pares favourably with rice, then there is an
overall gain in such a shift. This reasoning is
implicitly based on average values of farm-
ers’ income, despite the fact that, in peasant
agriculture, risk is a much more relevant
concern. Scott (1976) has shown that the sus-
tainability of peasant economies was more
closely governed by vagaries in yields than
by average values, and it has also been
shown that people resented smaller, fixed
taxes much more than larger ones indexed
on real yields. It can be argued that yields in
the irrigated areas discussed in this chapter
are made stable by the use of irrigation. It
must not be overlooked, however, that risk
in production, in any case not negligible (dis-
eases, grasshoppers, etc.), has been replaced
by risk in marketing, further compounded
by the higher requirements of cash input
demanded by commercial crops. As a gen-
eral rule, the potential return of capital
investments is strongly correlated to the
level of risk attached to the undertaking
(Molle et al., 2001b). This is clearly exempli-
fied by Szuster et al. (2003) in their compara-
tive study of rice and shrimp farming in the
Chao Phraya delta. In other words, on aver-
age, cash crops may fetch higher prices but
they are also subject to more uncertainty,
either in terms of yields or of farm-gate
prices. Thus, only those farmers with enough
capital reserve to weather the losses experi-
enced in some years can benefit from the
overall mid-term higher returns; others go
bankrupt and remain indebted. Shrimp
farming, again, provides a good example of
such a situation.
This situation differs significantly from
that of Western agriculture, where bottom
prices or ‘intervention schemes’ are gener-
ally established to compensate for economic
losses when they occur (more on this later).
In addition, Western farmers generally bene-
fit from insurance (against exceptional yield
losses), which comes with stronger coopera-
tive and professional structures.
It could be argued, however, that the price
of rice is also highly uncertain and that rice
production suffers from uncertainty as much
as other crops. If the price of rice does fluctu-
ate, its crucial importance for the rural econ-
omy brings it under more scrutiny. Despite
recurring complaints, echoed in newspapers,
that rice farmers lose money when producing
rice, the political impact of possible low prices,
in reality, largely shields them from dropping
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16 This is derived from the vision of the large amount of water that must be diverted, in particular to
meet land-preparation requirements and seepage/infiltration losses, but much less so on a purely
agronomic basis (water depleted by ET).
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under the reproduction threshold. Ad hoc
public interventions are always implemented
when such a risk arises (even though their
impact generally falls short of expectations
and benefits tend to be captured by millers
and other actors in the rice industry). This
does not hold, however, for secondary or mar-
ginal crops (which invariably include the
desirable ‘cash crops’), and complaints of scat-
tered producers have little chance of being
heard in the case of depressed prices. A typical
example of such a cash crop is chilli, a rather
capital- and labour-intensive crop, which can
fetch 25 baht kg1 in one year (providing a
high return) and 2–3 baht kg1 in the follow-
ing year (with a net loss for farmers).
Theoretically, a shift to non-rice crops
could be elicited by differential taxes for crop
type or water use (when individual or group
volumetric pricing is possible). However,
such a measure will only be significant if the
tax differential represents a significant share
of the income, say 10% or more. Perry (1996)
found that volumetric charges in Egypt were
an unrealistic means of encouraging signifi-
cant reductions in demand because, in order
to have an influence on demand, charges
would have to be very high.17 Raising (fixed)
taxation to such levels would only increase
the risk attached to non-rice crops, thus pro-
ducing an effect opposite to that desired.
Evidence of the dynamics of diversification
in the delta (Kasetsart University and IRD,
1996) points to the fact that farmers display
great responsiveness to market changes and
opportunities (a point definitely confirmed by
the recent spectacular development of inland
shrimp farming (Szuster and Flaherty, 2000)).
Good transportation and communication net-
works allow marketing channels to perform
rather efficiently. The main weak point
remains the risk attached to the frequent fluc-
tuation of the prices of field crops, which dis-
courages farmers from shifting significantly to
non-rice crops. As long as the economic envi-
ronment of field-crop production remains
unattractive and uncertain, there is little incen-
tive for farmers to adopt such crops and a lim-
ited basis to sustain criticism of their growing
rice, as many have incurred losses by growing
field crops (either of their own accord or at the
suggestion of extension services).
In addition, there are several other con-
straints (agroecology – heavy soil with little
drainage, not favourable to growing field
crops, labour18 and capital requirements,
skill learning, development of proper mar-
keting channels, etc.) that have an impact on
the process of diversification and it is doubt-
ful whether ‘pushing’ for it would be even-
tually beneficial. Siriluck and Kammeier’s
(2000) study of a large-scale public pro-
gramme aimed at encouraging crop diversi-
fication shows that such interventions meet
with mixed success and are not flexible
enough to adapt to different physical and
socio-economic environments. Contrary to
common rhetoric, farmers do not need to
have their water priced to shift to other pro-
ductions. They will increasingly do so if the
uncertainty about water and commodity
prices is reduced. They have time and again
shown dramatic responsiveness to con-
straints on other production factors, such as
land and labour (Molle and Srijantr, 1999),
and have already sufficiently experienced
the scarcity of water to adapt their cropping
patterns, should conditions be favourable.
Water Productivity and Sectorial
Allocations
The last form of achieving economic gains in
productivity is to reallocate water used in agri-
culture to other sectors, which invariably dis-
play a higher return per m3 used. There is a
conspicuous and widespread argument that
(public) centralized water allocation in
Thailand has reached its limits and that water
rights and water markets would provide a
flexible mechanism to allow the reallocation of
scarce resources towards the most economi-
cally profitable uses. This is strongly reminis-
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17 The price required to induce a 15% fall in demand for water would have reduced farm incomes by 25%.
18 For example, the harvest of mung bean, a typical supplementary crop with no additional water
requirements, is often a problem because of labour shortage.
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cent of the deadlock experienced in the west-
ern USA, where water rights19 are locked in
uses of low productivity and where market
mechanisms constitute one of the ways out of
the stalemate (see Huffaker et al., 2000). The
claim that central agencies have failed in prop-
erly allocating water has become a refrain sup-
porting the idea of markets as an alternative.
In the Thai context, commentators do not
hesitate to incorporate this concern into their
rationale, asserting that the state has proved
inefficient in allocating water to the most
beneficial uses.20 It is intriguing to see the
ubiquity of this argument, even outside its
‘original’ context, and how it permeates
debates even in settings where this problem
has been handled relatively successfully.
Contrary to the alleged government failure
in allocating water resources, sectorial alloca-
tion in Thailand (as in most countries) has
been driven by a clear priority in use, which
mirrors the economic return of all activities.
Cases of non-agricultural activities, in partic-
ular industrial ones, that would have been
constrained or impeded by the lack of water
are unheard of and it is hard to see how criti-
cism of central allocation can fly in the face
of such evidence. The deadlock experienced
in the western USA is unknown here and
establishing a water market might create
exactly the kind of problems it is assumed to
solve, should, as is apparent in the USA, the
rural sector be reluctant to relinquish its
established rights.
It seems that the argument is loosely
based on the implicit (but fallacious)
assumption that, if the agriculture sector
uses a share of Thai (controlled) waters as
high as 80% then it is likely to enjoy a sort of
privilege, to the detriment of other activities.
It is also often (rightly) stressed that saving
5% of water in agriculture would represent a
huge amount for other activities, but not that
the latter are not directly claiming it, as they
are effectively served first. To present the
agriculture sector as the spoilt, unrepentant
and ungrateful child of the nation does little
justice to the fact that farmers are, in fact,
served with the (fluctuating) left-over water
in the system. This share happens to be the
largest one only because other uses have not
yet developed to a wider magnitude (and
also because the government (not the farm-
ers) has invested in infrastructure allowing
the use of this water for irrigation). The argu-
ment glosses over the facts that: (i) this share
will decline in the future (as agriculture is
usually deprived of its water when other sec-
tors grow);21 and (ii) the unwritten ‘rights’ of
farmers being limited to the left-over water,
the farm sector has to cope with a very fluc-
tuating supply, which also generates severe
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19 There is some irony in the evidence that, if the Thai legal system had been based on prior
appropriation rights, as in the western USA, the delta would have been granted senior rights on water
since the 1960s or earlier and Bangkok would now be trying to buy these rights from farmers. In such a
case, farmers would at present not be asked to pay but, on the contrary, courted to accept money as
compensation!
20 A typical example is provided by Christensen and Boon-Long (1994): ‘a concern which could raise
problems in the area of basin management involves the authority of the basin [administration] to impose
allocation priorities … The burden of proof for such an initiative is to show that command and control
could result in better allocations and less market failure.’ Israngkura (2000), for his part, considers that ‘the
returns on the irrigation dam investment have been low due to the lack of effective water demand
management that could prevent less productive water utilisation’. This suggests that irrigation and its
assumed low return have deprived other potentially more productive uses, whereas irrigation is, in fact,
allocated the leftovers in the system (after the prioritization of water to BMA and energy production). TDRI
(2001) posits that ‘the current command and control system are unable to meet structural and cyclical
changes in the demand and supply of natural resources, including water’, while Kraisoraphong (1995)
states: ‘Past experience has shown the government’s role to be ineffective and thus an alternative proposed
by economists and the academic circles has been to use economic instruments such as water pricing’.
21 Experiences from Israel, the USA, India or China indicate (Postel, 1992a) that, in all cases, the share of
agriculture was decreased to the benefit of cities.
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difficulties for management and for ensuring
equity in allocation (see Molle, et al., 2001a).
In addition, there are practical considera-
tions that relegate water transactions to the
category of fancy mind games. Reallocation
of water is difficult to achieve because it
requires not only an accurate definition of
individual rights but also a very high degree
of control of water and transportation facili-
ties to transfer water from one user to the
other. The assertion that ‘if the price of rice is
low, [Thai] farmers would be happy to cede
their right to industrialists’ (Wongbandit,
1997), runs counter to the most basic evi-
dence. Industrialists or cities are served first
and would do nothing with more water
allotted to them when the price of rice is low,
let alone the fact that the physical constraints
of the distribution network make such a re-
allocation impossible. How would the
‘rights’ of a group of farmers in, say,
Kamphaeng Phet (middle basin) be trans-
ferred to a given golf-course or factory in the
suburbs of Bangkok?
Central allocation may appear as a prob-
lem to farmers, who are, effectively, gradu-
ally dispossessed of their unwritten ‘rights’
as other uses grow, but this is not a problem
to other economic sectors, which are served
at low or no cost22 and on a priority basis.
The definition of entitlements and their
transfer within a ‘bank’ or a market mecha-
nism would, indeed, have the positive conse-
quence of providing a mechanism through
which the ineluctable dispossession of farm-
ers would be accompanied by financial com-
pensation. In any case, we are very far from
a situation in which individuals rights could
be defined. The transfer of group-based enti-
tlements would lead to extremely high trans-
action costs and to internal conflicts, so that
such an option is both illusory and unattrac-
tive under present conditions.
Lastly, the very notion of economic pro-
ductivity as a macro-level aggregate must
also be scrutinized through the lens of its
social and equity implications. The idea is
basically that ‘if an irrigator can earn more
by selling water to a nearby city than by
spreading it on alfalfa, cotton or wheat,
transferring that water from farm to city use
is economically beneficial’ (Postel, 1992b),
this reallocation being either occasional or
permanent. The theory works as long as the
reallocation of factors occurs between activi-
ties that constitute alternatives for invest-
ments and between users who also have a
range of opportunities and compete in a per-
fect market. In other words, this holds for the
logic of capitalistic investment, which consti-
tutes the underpinning and driving force of
the proposed economic mechanisms. The
small peasant, however, often distinguishes
him/herself by a lack of choice or, rather, by
an alternative which is, willingly or not, quit-
ting the farm sector.23 If farmers who are
unduly exposed to the competition of sectors
with a much higher profitability were even-
tually led to leave their lands fallow (or to
sell them to big farmers), they could ulti-
mately swell the ranks of the unemployed
(and even the slum population in the capital
if there is a strong push process at work). It
is hard to see how the overall benefit of the
society would be maximized by such a sce-
nario, despite the fact that macro-indicators 
would (deceivingly) suggest an overall gain.
The impact of the diversion of water out of
agriculture is a complex issue (Rosegrant
and Ringler, 1998), but in developing coun-
tries with large agriculture sectors and per-
centages of rural poor there is often little
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22 Non-agricultural users pay for (part of) the cost of production (abstraction, treatment, transfer) but not
for water itself.
23 Similarly, it is often inferred from observations that some farmers, in particular contexts (such as
Pakistan), are led to pay high amounts of money for secure water and that ‘farmers are willing to pay’
(Postel, 1992b; World Bank, 1993). A less optimistic reading would be to assume that many of these
farmers do so because they have no choice and because survival, indeed, entails a high ‘willingness to
pay’. This would be consistent with observations that these informal markets are sometimes not
competitive, and the prices charged are higher than theoretically expected.
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room to manoeuvre.24 This concern is also
echoed by the World Bank economist W.
Price (1994): 
In time, markets in water may expand, but only
in locations with extreme scarcity of resources
and where municipal or industrial users can
afford to pay a large amount per unit of water
to an agricultural user – enough for a farmer to
invest in another business or to become
economically independent. The conditions in
South Asia are a long way from this.
Advocates for free markets may place
excessive emphasis on aggregated economic
values and tend to ignore differences among
actors. Schiller and Fowler (1999), for exam-
ple, stress that ‘Ag-urban transfers allow
California as a whole to use water more effi-
ciently. Because they are voluntary, such
transfers constitute positive-sum, or
‘win–win’ situations in which both parties
come out ahead’ (emphasis added). The
point is that ‘as a whole’ and ‘voluntary’
might in fact not always be realized and
could conceal situations of ‘no choice’ or
‘win–lose’ situations with no alternative for
one party in the transaction.25 The seductive
perspective to reach an automatic and opti-
mal ‘match of supply and demand’ is, again,
a macro-level aggregated vision that ignores
how the demand is characterized and what
happens to those who cannot even formulate
their demand because they cannot compete
with bigger players.
Constraints and Opportunities for Water
Reform
The meagre benefits that can be expected on
the productivity side, in all senses of the
term, do not imply that the status quo is the
best option. Although this takes us beyond
the limited scope of this chapter, a few com-
ments are given here regarding the reform of
the water sector.
Current disruptions in the Thai water sys-
tems relate to difficulties in both allocation
and distribution (Molle et al., 2001a). In small
basins of the north, water diversion needs
sometimes exceed the available flow and
there is a lack of technical and legal criteria
to referee the disputes that arise. In the Chao
Phraya basin, the supply to irrigated areas,
notably the delta, is made chaotic because of
the lack of control over users in the middle
basin: over a span of 15 years, the percentage
of dam releases diverted (often ‘hijacked’!)
by these users in the dry season moved up
from 5% to 35%. Unscheduled planting of
rice, often done by using residual surface
water or groundwater, also contributes to
creating local mismatches between effective
supply and demand, triggering political
interventions and raising the uncertainty in
supply. Achieving equity in allocation is also
made difficult by the fact that available
water stocks (from storage dams) vary, for
each dry season, between 2 and 8 Bm3. As a
result, it has proved unsustainable to stick to
the rotational allocation policy established in
the early 1980s, in which half of each project
was to receive water in 1 out of 2 years,
because this ‘right’ could not be ensured.
There is a wide (rhetorical) consensus that
‘water rights’ must be defined, that the
administrative management of the water sec-
tor must be simplified and that a water law
and basin organizations are needed. This fits
a vague picture of modernization along the
lines of what is presented as international
‘best practices’ or standards, and meets little
opposition. Some wishful thinking helps 
one assume that such reforms will take place
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24 This is, in reality, not peculiar to developing countries. In the western USA, Frederik (1998) reports
that ‘when farmers want to sell water to cities, irrigation districts resist, fearing the loss of agricultural
jobs that accompany rural water use’, while Wahl (1993) acknowledges that ‘most agricultural water
districts have viewed the potential for water transfers only very tentatively out of concern over the
security of their water rights and potentially adverse effects on the districts and local communities’.
25 Similarly ‘users’ is a neutral word that tells us little about their heterogeneity in terms of strategies and
factor endowment. See, for example, World Bank (1994): ‘Reliance on the price mechanism is in the interest
of users because it directs provision towards preferences determined by users rather than by bureaucrats.’
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by their own momentum, but there is limited
debate on the substance of such reforms, and
heavy doubt over whether provisions would
be eventually enforced. Legal provisions are
obviously useless without a basic capacity
for law enforcement and penalties, an aspect
in which Thailand admittedly has an unim-
pressive record (Christensen and Boon-Long,
1994; Wongbandit, 1995; Flaherty et al., 1999).
Countries like Sri Lanka and certain states of
India have been debating water laws for 30
years without effectively enacting a law
(Shah et al., 2000) and, when they did, the
most critical aspects either were removed
from the final version or remained a dead
letter (see also the example of Vietnam
(Malano et al., 2000)).
If such reforms are well intentioned and
probably sound as a general guideline for
long-term changes, it needs to be recognized
that their implementation must be phased
and conceived as a long-term process. For
example, before considering establishing
rights, participatory water-allocation
processes at different relevant levels of the
basin should be geared towards designing
ways to define seasonal entitlements, which
also implies regaining control over schedul-
ing, over the expansion of irrigated areas
and over unofficial water abstraction. This,
in turn, has far-reaching administrative,
technical and political implications, which
are not subject to full control: in other words,
reforms or laws are like water off a duck’s
back if they are not strongly backed by
politicians and officials. What is known
about the resilience of the Thai ‘bureaucratic
polity’ (see, for example, Nelson, 1998;
Arghiros, 1999) should preclude any opti-
mism on the extent of the decentralization
process,26 as well as on the propensity of the
administration to hand over its power
swiftly and willingly. It is often implicitly
assumed that the state bureaucracy is a neu-
tral monolithic agency, sensitive to rational
arguments about cost-effectiveness or public
welfare. Pinstrup-Andersen (1993)27 has
shown that this was unrealistic and that the
failure to incorporate knowledge of goals
and behaviours of agencies and politicians
was the most common feature of poor poli-
cies. A positive way of looking at the ongo-
ing processes is to view these initiatives as
part of a learning process. However, there is
a risk that a partial failure would also make
the participation of farmers increasingly dif-
ficult in the future.
Conclusions
The justification for the current proposals for
a reform of the Thai water sector rests heavily
on assumptions of low irrigation efficiency
and poor economic productivity, despite the
wide irrelevance of these arguments in the
Thai context. There is a risk that well-inten-
tioned reforms will draw upon blueprints
based more on some ideological drive28 than
on in-depth and site-specific analyses of the
situation, and will end up being superim-
posed on the Thai context. The ubiquitous
caveat found in many conclusions of papers
dealing with the economics-based regulation
of water use is found to be often widely dis-
regarded in practice: it cautions against
applying general principles without due con-
sideration being given to the historical, geo-
graphical, cultural, socio-economic and
political contexts. Policies that are believed to
have proved successful are often replicated
blindly and lead to resounding failure. This
applies to various aspects of the water sector,
including irrigation-system design, water
institutions (Shah et al., 2000; Molle, 2003b) or
water legislation (e.g. the replica versions of
the Chilean Código de Aguas (see Dourojeanni
and Jouravlev, 1999)).
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26 However unsatisfying in the short term, the decentralization process is nevertheless a far-reaching
political process that will in the long run bring more democratization. But this time frame, again, is in
opposition to that of the proposed reforms.
27 His focus was on food and nutrition policies but his conclusions can be applied to water policy as
well.
28 On how ideology shapes public interventions and policy in the Thai water sector, see Molle (2003b).
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If most of the irrelevance of the argu-
ments based on efficiency is linked to the
closed nature of the Chao Phraya basin, then
we must recognize the importance of devis-
ing reforms that distinguish between differ-
ent types of basins, and even between
different hydronomic zones (Molden et al.,
2001). The Mae Klong basin, which also ends
up in the Chao Phraya delta, presents a dif-
ferent picture. The average annual inflow
into the main two upstream storage dams is
approximately 30% above the average
requirements in the basin. This means that
the possible low efficiency of irrigation is
hardly an issue. At the other end of the spec-
trum, water-short basins, such as the Chao
Phraya basin, have gradually developed
means of raising efficiency in use (gating of
drains, conjunctive use of groundwater,
pumping water from ponds and other low-
lying areas, improving the management of
dams, etc.) and may not lend themselves to
significant improvements in that respect
(Molle, 2003a). At present, only 12% of dam
water is wasted by evaporation or going to
the sea in the dry season (Molle et al., 2001a).
It has also been shown that the central-
ized water-allocation system has handled the
issue of allocating water to activities with
higher economic return relatively well, and
that the alleged ‘lion’s share’ of water for
agriculture is actually the (fluctuating) left-
over water in the system after allocation to
higher-prioritized uses has been met. With
reduced scope for achieving water savings or
economic reallocation, the prospects for
achieving significant gains in productivity
are slim, and the concepts of a water charge
or water markets lose most of their appeal.
However, the ‘virtuous’ linkage existing
between structural, managerial, institutional
and financial approaches is also recognized
(Small, 1996). The strongest argument about
water pricing is the ‘glue factor’, where pric-
ing is considered as a mere reinforcing factor
of a contractual binding between the RID
and groups of users. The ‘wholesaling’ of
water to groups is an option that comes with
several prerequisites, and emphasis is placed
on the existing gap between these conditions
and the current situation. However, if joint
management and farmers’ financial partici-
pation are desirable, there is still little empir-
ical evidence of the impact of turnover on
productivity (Samad, 2001); the gains are
unlikely to be large, especially when no vol-
umetric pricing is possible.
In contrast to the more appealing justifica-
tions based on the idea of ‘saving water’,
which readily relates to the concrete experi-
ence of water shortage, it appears that the
major changes to be brought about by reforms
relate to water allocation within the agricul-
ture sector (with full participation of users), to
the control of new diversions, to equity and to
the control of environmental impacts.
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